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FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS

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European Military Policies

BY DAVID H. POPPER

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BY DAVID H. POPPER

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WHEN German troops appeared in the Rhineland on March 7, 1936, the last remaining military servitude imposed on the Reich by the Versailles Treaty became a dead letter.¹ This event, like the collapse of the Disarmament Conference in 1934 and the adoption of military conscription in Germany on March 16, 1935, has been followed throughout Europe by military measures which reveal widespread fear of war. France has strengthened the forces on its eastern frontier and announced the indefinite retention with the colors of 175,000 conscripts who had completed their term of service and were about to return to their homes.² Representatives of the British, French and Belgian general staffs met in London on April 15, 1936 to plan joint action, in case of German attack in the West. Italy, although absorbed in the prosecution of the Ethiopian war, had previously managed to maintain a million men under arms in the homeland to check Nazi designs on Austria.³ At the same time, friction increased in other areas of tension—in the Mediterranean, in the Pacific, along the Mongolian frontier.

The rapid succession of European diplomatic crises and war scares has enhanced the probability of a general war involving all the major military powers on the Continent. The rapid rate at which the number of men trained to bear arms and the sums of money allocated for war purposes have grown in these states is a matter of general knowledge. Less attention, however, has been paid to the manner in which war resources are to be used; yet without information on this point the nature

of the struggle which threatens Europe cannot be fully understood. This report analyzes some recent trends in military thought and their effect on military organization among the Continental states which would presumably become embroiled at the outset of a European conflict—France, Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union.

REACTION FROM WAR STALEMATE

The World War was characterized by the apotheosis of huge mass armies utilizing to the full the man-power of the belligerent nations. Generally speaking, the power of defense—especially on confined fronts where outflanking was impossible—triumphed over the strongest offensive efforts. In the West the conflict resolved itself into a war of attrition. Because of greatly increased ability to cover a given area with projectiles, large forces became unable to advance effectively. The fire-power of the machine gun proved more than a match for unprotected infantry. What forward movements there were depended heavily on artillery, with infantry attacking only after the battleground had been literally sprayed with shells.⁴ Considering its meager results, this method of conducting an offensive proved an utter failure. Since all the machine-gun emplacements of the enemy were not destroyed, it was costly in lives as well as money and resources. It defeated its own end by making advance over the cratered terrain extremely difficult. It destroyed

1. Apparently Germany has as yet constructed no fortifications in the former demilitarized zone, but the Hitler government has refused to give assurances that it will not do so in the future.

2. *Le Temps* (Paris), March 20, 1936; *New York Times*, April 8, 1936.

3. *Le Temps*, October 21, 1935.

4. In the third battle of Ypres, which took place during the summer and autumn of 1917, the British fired 4,283,550 shells, costing £22,000,000, in the preliminary bombardment before the battle opened. The estimated weight of these projectiles is 107,000 tons. J. F. C. Fuller, "The Mechanisation of Warfare," *What Would Be the Character of a New War?* (London, Gollancz, 1933), p. 56. For similar figures for other battles, cf. J. F. C. Fuller, *War and Western Civilization, 1832-1932* (London, Duckworth, 1932), pp. 228 ff.

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the element of surprise, now more than ever essential if the tactical superiority of the defense is to be overcome.⁵ Finally, it placed a serious strain on the morale of all belligerents.

Toward the close of the World War military leaders began experimenting with new forms of combat designed to end this costly stalemate. The tank was utilized as an armored front to pierce the defensive wall of machine guns. Air bombardment of centers of supply and of cities in the rear became increasingly common, with mass air operations planned for 1919 by the Allies. A new form of infantry tactics was introduced by the Germans in the spring of 1918. Under the new system—based on the principle of applying strength against weakness, and avoiding exposure of masses of men to machine guns—little groups of men were required to penetrate the “soft spots” between enemy posts and machine-gun nests. Reserves then passed through the breaches to outflank and cut off the strong remnants of the defense. This form of tactics differs fundamentally from the conventional frontal attack, which is a direct thrust using reserves to reinforce units meeting with resistance, rather than follow up forces which have penetrated the enemy line.⁶

After conclusion of the war, the military conservatism which had prevented earlier and wider recourse to methods for ending the impasse was roundly condemned in the former belligerent states. The prospect of repeating a war of exhaustion was distasteful to strategists and statesmen alike. Not unnaturally, therefore, military theorists have seized on the possibilities offered by continuous technological improvement of weapons used for the first time in 1914-1918. By developing tactical potentialities barely revealed during the conflict, they are urging general staffs to restore decisive striking power to armed forces and resuscitate the elements of mobility and surprise.

NEW THEORIES OF WAR

DOUHETISM—ANNIHILATION FROM THE AIR

The air weapon, practically unexploited at the beginning of the war, has since developed with remarkable rapidity. During the war the function of air forces was for the most part restricted to securing command of the air over the battleground and using it to aid in the conduct of hostilities by observation of artillery fire, reconnaissance, photography and sometimes direct attack on troops. The bombing of cities and of mobilization and

supply centers was distinctly a secondary function; aviation was envisaged as a supporting arm, not as an independent striking force.⁷

One of the earliest authorities to perceive the scope and possibilities of the new weapon was an Italian general, the late Giulio Douhet. His doctrines have profoundly influenced the development of military organization among the great powers and continue to do so in increasing degree as scientific advance furthers the potentialities of aircraft. Douhet's theory of air warfare rests on the premise that the air is the only realm in which defensive power is not sufficient to vitiate attack. He believed that unless one belligerent is overwhelmingly superior in land or sea forces, the air weapon alone offers an opportunity for quick, crushing decision. Hence it follows that the limited resources of the nation must be allocated in the first instance to aviation, with army and navy appropriations great enough only for a truly defensive establishment. To attain immediate mastery in the air, an independent air force composed of many combat bombing units and a few reconnaissance groups must be constructed. No planes are to be used for secondary functions like auxiliary military and naval aviation or aerial defense of home-territory and armies. At the opening of hostilities the air force will strike with all its power at “the most vulnerable targets and . . . those the annihilation of which is most likely to produce profound repercussions on the aerial power, and the moral and material resistance, of the enemy.”⁸ If the blow is completely successful, overtures for peace will be forthcoming at once.

A state acting in accord with these principles will construct large fleets of armed bombing planes for mass descent on enemy air bases and centers of mobilization, industry and administration.⁹ The weapons of destruction will include explosive bombs, gas projectiles and incendiary bombs—the latter type offering the most serious possibilities for crowded areas.¹⁰ While resistance from the

7. L. E. O. Charlton, *War from the Air: Past, Present, Future* (London, Nelson, 1935), pp. 44-65.

8. Giulio Douhet, *La Guerre de l'Air* (Paris, Journal “Les Ailes,” 1932), pp. 105, 106. For the most recent exposition and elaboration of this doctrine, cf. A. M. P. Vauthier, *La Doctrine de Guerre du Général Douhet* (Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1935); *idem*, “Le Général Douhet,” *Revue de Paris*, November 15, 1935, pp. 269-93.

9. The paramount importance of immediate destruction of enemy air bases is discussed in Sikorski, *La Guerre Moderne*, cited, pp. 156-58.

10. Although popular writers frequently draw lurid pictures of toxic gas attack on civilian populations in a future war, military authorities are apparently most concerned with the effects of incendiary bombs. These bombs, weighing only one to five pounds each, can be scattered over cities in great numbers. Cf. F. Ganderberger von Moisy, *Luftkrieg—Zukunftskrieg?* (Berlin, Zentralverlag, 1935), p. 86.

5. General W. Sikorski, *La Guerre Moderne* (Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1935), p. 124.

6. For more detailed consideration, cf. B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Future of Infantry* (London, Faber, 1933), pp. 26-28.

ground by means of anti-aircraft guns is to be encouraged and passive defense—measures for the protection of population and property—is to be organized, it is generally conceded that the entire problem of air defense is hardly soluble. The air offensive is believed to be the best, if not the only, guarantee of security of home territory against air attack.¹¹

NEW THEORIES OF WAR ON LAND

Another school of theorists, less preoccupied with the development of aviation, has turned its attention to the problem of combating increased defensive fire-power. Military thought on this subject has been devoted chiefly to a study of methods for utilizing the further development of tanks and other armored vehicles, whose potentialities were disclosed by the enormous success of comparatively crude models introduced in the latter half of the war.¹² In Britain, and to some extent in France, radical changes in the conduct of modern warfare are proposed. Some writers, seeking to revive the historic rôle of cavalry, urge the use of large mechanized forces for decisive maneuvers against the enemy.¹³ With speed and surprise effect increased by the motor, the new forces are to execute flank movements, bearing down against the enemy's rear, interrupting his line of supply and blocking his retreat. The result is expected to be rapid demoralization of the enemy rather than his defeat by brute force or attrition.¹⁴

While this doctrine has also been enunciated in France, the preponderance of French military opinion assumes repetition of the unbroken line, frontal attack situation of 1914-1918. The tank is consequently viewed as a weapon to overcome defensive superiority by virtue of its armored, mobile fire-power. Placed in the van of an infantry assault, it is to combat machine guns and light artillery with minimum loss of life, and thus open a gap in the opposing line through which infantry can advance.¹⁵ German authorities envisage the tank

as a weapon which will play an important part in breaching a fortified line by sudden and crushing surprise attack.¹⁶

Somewhat akin to the British view is the well-known theory of General von Seeckt, the moving spirit behind the organization of the Reichswehr under the Weimar Republic. Von Seeckt, turning the Versailles Treaty restrictions to advantage, predicts that success in attack will rest on the performance of relatively small, highly trained and extremely mobile bodies of professional troops striking hammer blows. Reinforcement of these troops, home defense, and auxiliary functions would be performed by a conscript mass army.¹⁷

Not all commentators, however, have thus denied the conventional rôle of mass infantry. While crediting infantry with only a limited function in war, some have nevertheless proposed methods by which it may regain its tactical mobility. These are as a rule little more than an elaboration of the "infiltration" tactics described above. For their effectiveness they require infantry combat by small, autonomous groups of picked men trained to take full advantage of the terrain.¹⁸ Automatic weapons, machine guns, mortars and light artillery are used in close support. Thus endowed, an infantry regiment can itself conduct an independent offensive of limited scope. On the basis of this type of tactics another group of military theorists, prominent in Italy, pins its hope on infantry as the essential arm in warfare. In its view no secondary operations for partial ends should be permitted to divert resources from the ultimate goal. Attack must be steady, proceeding without pause and with constantly increasing power. Breaches must be exploited to the full; once past the enemy's line of resistance, the attacking troops are to be passed by fresh, motorized forces which continue the offensive.¹⁹

All these theories have one point in common: they demand a recasting of the army as it existed in the post-war period. The new doctrines, usually propounded by military men, have slowly gained adherents among general staff organizations. It is safe to say that none of the world's large armies

11. Vauthier, "Le Général Douhet," cited; cf. speech of Stanley Baldwin, November 10, 1932, Great Britain, House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, Fifth series, vol. 270 (London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1932), pp. 632 ff.

12. Increased speed, range, armor protection, fire-power and flexibility in tanks since 1918 are described in Ludwig Ritter von Eimannsberger, *Der Kampfswagenkrieg* (München, Lehmanns Verlag, 1934), pp. 1-101.

13. Mechanized forces are composed of armored fighting vehicles (tanks, combat cars, etc.), generally equipped with automatic weapons (machine guns).

14. Cf. B. H. Liddell Hart, *The British Way in Warfare* (New York, Macmillan, 1933), pp. 174 ff.; J. F. C. Fuller, *The Army in My Time* (London, Rich and Cowan, 1935), p. 207.

15. Sikorski, *La Guerre Moderne*, cited, pp. 126-27; cf. also Marie-Eugène Debeney, "La Motorisation des Armées Modernes," *Revue des Deux Mondes* (Paris), March 15, 1936, pp. 273-91.

16. "Neugestaltung der Kriegführung," *Militär-Wochenblatt* (Berlin), November 18, 1935, pp. 791, 792; Major M. Köhler, "Lehren aus dem Festungskriege," *ibid.*, October 18, 1935, pp. 619-20.

17. Hans von Seeckt, *Thoughts of a Soldier* (translated by Gilbert Waterhouse; London, Benn, 1930), pp. 61-67.

18. Liddell Hart, *The Future of Infantry*, cited, pp. 35-64.

19. Sebastiano Visconti-Prasca, *La Guerra Decisiva* (Milan, Grossi, 1934), pp. 35-148; A. Niessel, "La Doctrine de Guerre Italienne: la Guerra Décisive," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, November 1, 1935, pp. 211-18; R. v. Xyländer "Italienische Grundsätze für die höhere Truppenführung," *Militär-Wochenblatt*, September 11, 1935.

has remained unaffected by this trend. The direction and extent of recent military evolution, and its probable results for the conduct of future warfare, are treated below.

FRANCE

The supreme purpose of French strategy is to build a secure defense against the military might of Germany. France and the Reich possess a long common frontier which is only partially obstructed by natural barriers like the Rhine and the Vosges. Germany's population is over one and a half times that of France; its heavy industry is more extensive; its government makes inordinate efforts to militarize the populace. While Franco-German relations have deteriorated in recent years, the danger of French hostilities with Italy, once serious, has now markedly diminished.

Under the army laws of 1927-1928 the French army reflected its leaders' preoccupation with the study of defensive warfare and the doctrine of 1918. What was sought was a heavy volume of fire delivered by a mass army working in such a way as to allow little scope for flexibility or maneuver.²⁰ While the army laws authorized an establishment of 106,000 professional troops, this long-service force was not furnished with modern equipment and formed into a fighting élite. Instead, it had as its principal function the training of conscripts who were to constitute the mainstay of the combat machine. In case of hostilities a small professional frontier force, the conscript class under the colors, and men recently released from military service were to serve as *couverture*, or initial defensive force, until the reserves were mobilized, equipped and re-trained for action.²¹

Fearing the effects of a brutal surprise attack by highly mobile, mechanized forces before mobilization can be completed, some military observers advocate drastic overhauling of the French military system. To furnish the *couverture* with the strength and power of maneuver needed to parry a lightning blow, they demand that the bulk of military expenditure be devoted to the training of a volunteer, long-term service army of 100,000 men forming six divisions, one light division, and general reserves. In their opinion this force should be completely motorized and highly mechanized, with troops transported in high-speed, cross-country

vehicles; should be partially armored for protection and possess enormous fire-power; and should utilize tactics stressing speed, shock, surprise and camouflage.²² Because the mastery of new mechanical devices and methods of warfare requires considerable technical skill, this army would constitute a military élite; the mass of the nation, forming the reserve forces, would receive a rather rudimentary militia training requiring a short period of time.²³

Conservative military leaders object to these proposals on the ground that the necessary material is expensive and rapidly becomes obsolete. They doubt, moreover, that a sufficient number of men can be found to enlist for long periods of army life at any salary within the economic power of the state to pay. Some express the fear that the ranks of career soldiers could not be replenished when their numbers were diminished by the attrition of war. A dangerous dualism, they believe, would be created by the establishment of two military organizations, one for the élite of professional troops and one for the reserves. Claims made for the fighting power of certain machines are scouted as exaggerated, and emphasis is placed on the ease with which motorized columns can be attacked from the air.²⁴

ARMY REORGANIZATION

In the course of the public debate in France on the issue of army reorganization, it was generally admitted that French military needs might be summed up under two heads: improvement of the *couverture*, and acceleration of the mobilization of efficient man-power.²⁵ To achieve these objectives, the French army has undergone a gradual but comprehensive reorganization, the principal points of which are as follows:

1. Between 1929 and 1935 France erected along the German and Belgian frontiers a chain of modern fortifications designed to parry the thrust of a sudden German attack and protect the country until it can complete its mobilization.²⁶ These works, largely submerged beneath the surface or

20. General Alléhaut, *Etre Prêts* (Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1935), pp. 191-202; "With the French Army," *The Times* (London), June 20, 1935.

21. Cf. William T. Stone and David H. Popper, "The Increasing Burden of Armaments," *Foreign Policy Reports*, October 24, 1934; Marie-Eugène Debeney, *Sur la Sécurité Militaire de la France* (Paris, Payot, 1930), pp. 15-44.

22. Charles de Gaulle, *Vers l'Armée de Métier* (Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1934); address of Paul Reynaud in the Chamber of Deputies, March 15, 1935, *Le Temps*, March 17, 1935.

23. "L'Évolution Nécessaire de notre Armée," *L'Europe Nouvelle*, May 18, 1935, p. 467. This type of army closely resembles the force proposed by General von Seeckt.

24. Marie-Eugène Debeney, "Encore l'Armée de Métier," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, July 15, 1935, pp. 279-95; "La Prolongation du Service Militaire," *L'Europe Nouvelle*, March 2, 1935, pp. 199 ff.; Alléhaut, *Etre Prêts*, cited, pp. 178-80.

25. General Baratier, "Vers le Renforcement," *Le Temps*, April 19, 1935; Alléhaut, *Etre Prêts*, cited, p. 173.

26. A similar line of fortifications is being constructed along the Belgian-German frontier.

otherwise camouflaged, are provided with elaborate systems of communication, gas defense, electric power and fire control. Troops can live within the structures for months. A carefully plotted scheme of interlacing fire permits a veritable hail of explosives to sweep all approaches from several angles within a few minutes from the time of an alarm.²⁷

2. Without adequately trained personnel to man them, the fortifications are valueless. French strategists have worked out a system of defense which combines speed in repelling attack with flexibility in meeting unexpected assaults. In brief, the arrangement consists of a fortified front, permanently garrisoned and divided into sectors; behind it, local reserves under sector commanders; still farther to the rear, the mobile forces of the *couverture*; and finally, the general reserves of the army.²⁸ By March 1936, 24,000 crack professional troops were to have taken up permanent stations within the fortifications to act as a constant guard. Small, extremely mobile units of infantry and artillery watch over the interstices and make first contact with the enemy where he has broken through. Behind these local reserves there may be mobilized within a few hours the *forces mobiles de la couverture*, the core of France's new motor-mechanized army. This force is composed of seven motorized infantry divisions with all-tractor-drawn artillery and light armored carriers for mortars, machine guns and ammunition, and one mechanized cavalry division of armored fighting vehicles. It is to be used to deliver crushing counter-attacks against an advancing enemy. With its reserves of artillery, cavalry, tanks and engineers, the ensemble in many respects resembles the *armée de métier* demanded by progressive critics. The personnel is made up of professional troops, conscript specialists, and troops trained for auxiliary purposes but able to take over the positions of specialists as these become disabled.²⁹

3. With the problem of the *couverture* settled for the present, French authorities are attempting to improve preparations for mobilizing the mass of the nation and making it fit for action. Among the defects exhibited by recent troop experiments

are the slack condition of former conscripts, who could not in one year be fully instructed in the special duties necessitated by the use of modern material; the poor training of reserve officers, who are to lead conscript units; and the inflexibility of the whole mobilization system, which can easily be disrupted by well-planned air attack.³⁰ The French government, confronted by German rearmament and diminution of man-power due to the sharp decrease in births during the war years, has taken steps to maintain the number of conscripts in training and increase their efficiency as reserves. Under a provision of the law of March 31, 1928, the government on March 15, 1935 secured the approval of the Chamber of Deputies for an increase in the period of active military service from one to two years.³¹

INDEPENDENT AIR FORCE FOR "REPRISALS"

The year 1933 witnessed important changes in the French doctrine of air warfare. Before that date the chief function of the air force had been to aid the army and navy as a cooperating auxiliary, much as it had done during the war. For this purpose it was generally admitted to be the strongest in the world.³² Its planes dated from 1925 and its armament and munitions from the end of the war; its mobilization took place only when the land and sea forces prepared for action.³³ By laws, decrees and special credits on a lavish scale the French government has since the spring of 1933 renovated the air force in accord with a new conception bearing a strong resemblance to that of Douhet. An autonomous air force has been formed, whose mission is euphemistically referred to as preventing, by threat of a strong *riposte*, sudden air attack on mobilization centers, air bases and great industrial and transport centers.³⁴ Acting at the very outbreak of hostilities, it will attempt to disorganize enemy mobilization and concentration, and demoralize enemy populations.³⁵

27. For description of the fortifications, cf. Robert Poulaine, "Trois Mois avec l'Armée Française," Chaps. IV, V, *Le Temps*, July 26, August 1, 1935; "With the French Army," II, *The Times*, June 21, 1935.

28. Cf. General Baratier, "Vers le Renforcement," II, *Le Temps*, April 25, 1935.

29. Speech of Jean Fabry, War Minister, in the Chamber of Deputies, December 26, 1935, *Le Temps*, December 28, 1935; Poulaine, "Trois Mois avec l'Armée Française," cited, Chaps. VI-IX, *Le Temps*, August 6, 8, 14, 20, 1935; "With the French Army," I, *The Times*, June 20, 1935. The War Minister admitted in the Chamber that the mobile *couverture* should be able to spread devastation in the enemy's territory.

30. General Baratier, "Réorganisation des Réserves," *Le Temps*, May 8, 1935; Marshal Pétain, "La Sécurité de la France," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, March 1, 1935, pp. I-XX; Poulaine, "Trois Mois avec l'Armée Française," cited, *Le Temps*, October 13, 16, November 7, 1935.

31. For digest of definitive law, cf. *Le Temps*, March 19, 1936.

32. Charlotte de Faucigny-Lucinge, "L'Avenir de l'Aviation Française, interview de M. Pierre Cot," *L'Europe Nouvelle*, January 5, 1935.

33. Speech of General Denain, Air Minister, before the Congress of the National Union for Aerial Defense, *Le Temps*, April 4, 1935.

34. *Ibid*; also Pierre Frédéric, "Les Aviations et la Politique Européenne," *L'Europe Nouvelle*, December 22, 1934, pp. 1255-56.

35. Speeches of Laurent Eynac, chairman of Chamber air committee, *Le Temps*, April 3, 1935, and General Denain, *Le Temps*, March 21, 1935.

To transform the air force in this manner, the authorities have stressed quality rather than quantity and have reduced the number of first-line machines in France from 1,600 to 1,010.³⁶ By the spring of 1936 two-thirds of the air force was to have been equipped with new material.³⁷ All efforts are being centered on the production of multiplace combat planes, able to bomb and fight at once. The modernization program is intended to triple bombardment tonnage and double the radius of action of bombing planes, in order to encompass "all the objectives that . . . security requires us to have under our control."

GERMANY

Despite the Nazi policy of military secrecy, there is abundant evidence that the German army is undergoing a comprehensive reorganization which should near completion by the spring of 1937. The program of German rearmament, officially announced to the world in March 1935, is complemented by the fact that today all Germany is organized for war and in some degree lives on a war footing. Although no budget figures for arms expenditures have been published since 1934, it is known that rearmament costs played a predominant rôle in the stimulation of industrial activity which during the last months of 1935 reached a point higher than the peak figures of 1928. Heavy industries have expanded operations at the expense of production for direct consumption, while a stringent import control and a system of export subsidies permit the acquisition of large stocks of vital raw materials from abroad. Meanwhile, a drive for a degree of peace-time self-sufficiency, comparable only with the 1914-1918 war situation is being vigorously pushed.³⁸ Scientists are seeking low-cost substitutes for textile fibers, rubber and other materials not obtainable at home, while the production of oil fuel from coal is encouraged despite its expense.³⁹

36. General Denain, *L'Europe Nouvelle*, December 22, 1934, p. 1255. It should be noted that this figure refers only to first-line planes—that is, to those which would go into service immediately on the outbreak of war. First-line strength is in itself scarcely a valid indicator of substantive air power. According to Pierre Cot, former French Air Minister: "One never makes war with the planes one has; one makes war with the planes one manufactures." In other words, a high proportion of the planes employed for the opening raids in a new war is at once written off as lost; the war continues with the planes held in reserve and those which the carefully pre-organized industry of the country will proceed to manufacture in large quantities as soon as war breaks out. If, as seems probable, the war lasts more than a few days, industrial war potential will be the decisive factor for air supply.

37. Speech of General Hirschauer, special rapporteur on the air budget, in the Senate, *Le Temps*, December 30, 1935.

38. Lelarge d'Ervan, "L'Economie Allemande dans ses Rapports avec la Défense Nationale," *Revue Militaire Française* (Paris), July 1935.

Although the basic army organization of the Reich was not legally altered until March 16 and May 21, 1935,⁴⁰ military training forbidden by the Versailles Treaty had been carried on by the Nazi government before those dates.⁴¹ With the enactment of the 1935 legislation, the Reichswehr formally became one unit in a consolidated defense force composed of army, navy and air arm, all subordinated to a single ministry of war. In place of the seven divisions and 100,000 long-service troops of the Versailles Treaty force, the new army is composed of 12 corps commands and 36 divisions, totalling 550,000 men.⁴² Only ten corps areas have as yet been designated; it is believed that the remaining two will either be set up in the Rhineland, or represented by motorized, mobile troops.⁴³

Following the conventional conscript pattern, the new army is organized on the basis of universal, compulsory military service. The period of conscription is one year, but this is preceded by a six-month term of compulsory labor service during which the rudiments of military training are imparted. On November 1, 1935 a number of conscripts of the 1914 class, estimated by foreign correspondents at 200,000, formally began training.⁴⁴ Men of the 1910-1913 classes may report voluntarily for short periods of summer training, after which they pass into a supplementary reserve. Because of organizational difficulties, the army will not be fully prepared to fight for two or three years; by that time an annual average of 350,000 conscripts is expected. In the interim the Reich must overcome a shortage of reserve and non-commissioned officers, build more barrack accommodations, and improve technique in the use of new weapons.⁴⁵

The number of professional troops serving with the army for more than one year is set at 200,000.

39. André Giraudon, "L'Allemagne et la Préparation Economique de la Guerre," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, July 1, 1935, pp. 57-82; Dorothy Woodman, *Hitlers Luftflotte startbereit* (Paris, Carrefour, 1935), pp. 59 ff; General Serrigny, "Réarmement Allemand—Essences et Carburants," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, April 1, 1936, pp. 662-75.

40. For text of these basic military laws, cf. *Die Gesetzgebung des Kabinetts Hitler* (Berlin, Vahlen, 1935), Heft 12, Heft 13, p. 74 ff.

41. A member of the German General Staff has said that "a great number" of young Germans, camouflaged as Storm Troops, underwent a year of military service starting October 1, 1934. Hauptmann im Generalstab von Wedel, *Völkischer Beobachter*, January 3, 1936.

42. *Die Gesetzgebung des Kabinetts Hitler*, cited, Heft 12, p. 98.

43. René Lauret, "L'Armée Allemande," I, *Le Temps*, August 26, 1935.

44. *The Times*, October 30, 1935.

45. Cf. Otto Mossdorf, "Zum ersten Jahrestag der wiedergewonnenen Wehrfreiheit," *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (Berlin), March 15, 1936.

It is impossible definitely to state the composition of this force, but a large portion of it is made up of officers and men who enlisted for 12-year terms on or before April 1, 1933, and of the militarized police who, in fact, have formed a part of the Reich's military forces for years. Non-commissioned officers, moreover, serve for long periods; and potential conscripts volunteering for military service before they are normally called up may re-enlist for one year.⁴⁶ This nucleus of professional troops forms a military hierarchy believed to be the real repository of power in the Reich today. Its dominance, clearly revealed in the Putsch of June 30, 1934, has been re-enforced by defense laws giving the War Minister, General Werner von Blomberg, virtually absolute control of the country in time of war and full command of the nation's military activities in time of peace.⁴⁷ The renaissance of the army as an independent factor in German political life is symbolized by the quiet re-creation on July 1, 1935 of the German General Staff, whose existence was forbidden under the Versailles Treaty.⁴⁸ A decree of January 30, 1936 gives the army broad powers in quelling domestic disturbances.⁴⁹

There is little definite indication of the type of warfare for which the armed forces are being trained. The new army possesses all combat arms. Tank warfare and anti-tank defense are stressed.⁵⁰ The formation of armored units, not complete by the end of 1935, was revealed on September 27, 1935 when the post of Inspector of Motorized Troops was renamed "Commanding General of Armored Forces." Reich military strategists are giving thought to the problem of *attaque brusquée* in the West with highly mobile armored units—a mode of procedure deemed essential if the French fortress belt is to be breached.⁵¹ The rapid development of motorization is reflected in the construc-

tion of 4,500 miles of super-highways, clearly built for the use of heavy military vehicles. The road system, which spans the Reich, will aid transport of troops and supplies in another two-front war and will also effect a decentralization of means of mobilization, making the military machine less susceptible to air attack.⁵² The strategic doctrine of the armed forces is probably based on an elaboration of the theories of General von Seeckt. Since his return from China, significant references to the value of his work have been made by leading military figures, including General Ludwig Beck, chief of the General Staff.⁵³ The progress of rearmament appears to have strengthened the possibilities for warfare by highly trained mobile forces, now supported by a well-drilled and numerous mass army.

Since offensive action is rendered difficult by the French fortified line, some observers believe the Reichswehr is planning an indirect attack on France by way of Holland and Belgium in the north, and Switzerland in the south.⁵⁴ Another view, more widely accepted, is that by rearming and refortifying the Rhineland, the German General Staff is assuring its defensive position in the West while it prepares to strike swift, crushing blows in the East.⁵⁵ In accordance with Nazi theories of expansion in Eastern Europe and the struggle against communism, there is a heavy concentration of corps and divisional headquarters in eastern Germany. In East Prussia, because of its detached position and sparse population, the class of 1910 has been called to the colors as well as that of 1914; and men born in 1911, 1912 and 1913 will report for service in the course of the next three years.⁵⁶ The entire eastern border, moreover, from the southernmost juncture with Czechoslovakia to the Baltic in the north, is strongly fortified against an irruption.

The German air force, whose existence was first admitted on March 10, 1935, has since been built up with exceeding speed until it constitutes a major factor in European military calculations. Precise figures on its size are not available, but as far back as March 1935 Sir John Simon was informed by Hitler that the German force possessed 800 to 850 first line aircraft, and that the German

46. Hermann Foertsch, *Wehrpflicht-Fibel* (Berlin, Verlag "Offene Worte," 1935), p. 49.

47. Rudolf Olden, "The New Organisation of the German Army," *Contemporary Review* (London), July 1935, p. 22.

48. W. v. B. (Werner von Blomberg?), "Das Heer im Jahre 1935," *Militär-Wochenblatt*, January 4, 1936, pp. 1075-78. Its existence was not generally known for months. *Le Temps*, October 1, 1935; *New York Times*, October 16, 1935.

49. *New York Times*, January 31, 1936.

50. The Reich appears to be building light tanks of eight tons and under. Lauret, "L'Armée Allemande," cited. Three tank divisions now exist, each with about 350 of these weapons. *New York Times*, April 21, 1936. On anti-tank defense, cf. "La Défense Antichars," *Revue Militaire Française*, November 1935, pp. 208-09, 229-32.

51. The French are keenly alive to this possibility. Cf. General J. Pichon, "Guerre d'Hier et de Demain," *ibid.*, October 1935, pp. 5-34; also General X., "L'Armée de Métier," *Mercur de France* (Paris), April 1, 1936, pp. 9-18.

52. *The Times*, May 18, 1935.

53. *New York Times*, October 17, 1935.

54. For details on German preparatory measures in these areas, cf. *The Times*, February 7, 8, 1936; *Le Temps*, February 18, 1936.

55. Cf. Ralph W. Barnes, "Reich Reverses Schlieffen Plan for 'Next War,'" *New York Herald Tribune*, March 8, 1936; General Baratier, "Stratégie Rhénane," *Le Temps*, March 29, 1936.

56. *Gesetzgebung des Kabinetts Hitler*, cited, Heft 13, p. 98.

goal was parity with France—a figure assumed by the British government to be around 1,500.⁵⁷ How large the number of planes has grown since that date it is impossible to discover. There is no doubt that the design and production of aircraft is being forced almost as if the country were at war.⁵⁸ On the other hand, it appears that the terrific pressure for volume of construction has been accompanied by degeneration in quality; inferior types are being turned out to meet the immediate need for numbers. Thus, with regard to the really vital questions of offensive power, speed and radius of action, there is good reason to believe that at least a large part of the German air fleet is inferior by the latest standards.⁵⁹

ITALY

Although extremely vulnerable by sea and air, Italy is well situated with respect to attack by land. The northern mountain barrier makes advance by large armed forces virtually impossible, except in narrow coastal strips along the French and Yugoslav borders. To meet foreign menace to the vital industry and agriculture of northern Italy, three-fifths of the army is normally stationed in that area. Of the nine divisions maintained at full strength, four have in the past been stationed on the French frontier, one on the Swiss boundary, and four facing Yugoslavia.⁶⁰

Plenitude of men, poverty of wealth and hence of material, as well as the nature of the terrain on which hostilities are to take place have conditioned the development of the Italian army. Mountain warfare tactics predominate in its training; as a result, motorization for rapid troop transport is stressed, while mechanization—the use of armored fighting vehicles—has been relatively neglected, partly because of its limitations in mountainous territory.⁶¹ The strategic doctrine, once strongly influenced by General Douhet, has been considerably altered in the last few years. At present the objective is to attack the enemy before he reaches the vital centers of the North and to avoid a prolonged war, whose burden Italy could scarcely support.

The spirit of the offensive is consequently stressed among the troops, and Italy's man-power is utilized by making infantry the chief arm in battle.⁶² At all costs, Italy will strive to prevent the development of static warfare and preserve the mobility of the opening stages of conflict. The enemy is to be given no time to complete organization and border defense. Attack is too costly to be used merely for taking positions or causing enemy losses; it must be employed solely for strategic advantage directly conducive to victory.^{62a}

In accordance with the doctrine of Visconti-Prasca, infantry command is greatly decentralized, with platoons and even squads acting largely on their own initiative during offensive movements.⁶³ Unnecessary material is everywhere eliminated in favor of mobility. Infantry fire-power has been greatly increased by the addition of machine guns, mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns.⁶⁴ To support attack the number of light tanks, although still relatively small, is being rapidly increased.⁶⁵ Moreover, Italy in 1934 added a third "rapid" division to the two it already possessed, and in 1935 organized a new motorized division. The "rapid" divisions are composed chiefly of cavalry, cyclists, artillery, tanks and auxiliaries, while the motorized force depends entirely on motor vehicles for troop transport and supply.⁶⁶

In training its man-power for this military machine, Italy subjects the male population of eight years and over to an intensive course of "moral, physical and military preparation" for war.⁶⁷ Under the conscript system, the active army of 13 army corps and 31 divisions normally absorbs about 260,000 of the 560,000 men in each class for varying periods up to eighteen months.⁶⁸ There are, in addition, over 96,000 men in certain formations organized on a military basis, and about 375,000 members of the Volunteer Militia for National Security, a Fascist party organization closely linked

57. Stanley Baldwin, in House of Commons, May 22, 1935; Great Britain, House of Commons, *Parliamentary Debates*, cited, Fifth series, vol. 302, pp. 367-68.

58. Edmund T. Allen, "New Wings for a New Germany," *Aviation* (New York), January 1936, pp. 14-16; December 1935, pp. 11-13; Woodman, *Hitlers Luftflotte startbereit*, cited, Chap. 3.

59. "L'Aviation Militaire Allemande," *Le Temps*, January 14, 1936; Allen, "New Wings for a New Germany," cited.

60. M. Percheron, "L'Armée Italienne, Quintessence du Fascisme," *Revue de France*, October 15, 1935, pp. 719-35.

61. P. Gentizon, "L'Armée Italienne," III, *Le Temps*, August 21, 1935.

62. Visconti-Prasca, *La Guerra Decisiva*, cited, pp. 149-86 *et passim*; Percheron, "L'Armée Italienne," cited; speech of General Baistrocchi in Chamber, March 20, 1936, *Corriere della Sera*, March 21, 1936.

62a. R. v. Xylander, "Italienische Grundsätze für die höhere Truppenführung," cited.

63. Niessel, "La Doctrine de Guerre Italienne," cited.

64. Gentizon, "L'Armée Italienne," cited; speech of General Baistrocchi, cited.

65. Hugo Schäfer, *Kriegerisches Italien* (Potsdam, Vöggenteiler, 1935), p. 50; *Le Temps*, March 31, 1935.

66. "Die Italienische 'Motorisierte Division,'" *Militär-Wochenblatt*, October 18, 1935, pp. 627-28.

67. League of Nations, *Armaments Year-Book, 1935* (Geneva, 1935), p. 507; Schäfer, *Kriegerisches Italien*, cited, pp. 38 ff.

68. League of Nations, *Armaments Year-Book, 1935*, cited, pp. 485-87, 492, 517. Since the Alpine winter is the most secure of defenses against mass invasion, the number of troops with the colors is greatly reduced in autumn and winter. *Ibid.*, p. 518.

with the standing army.⁶⁹ The Fascist Militia not only takes over territorial functions such as guarding railways and frontiers, and coast and anti-aircraft defense—thus freeing the army for combat—but also participates on an equal footing with the regular army in maneuvers and operations.⁷⁰

Stimulated by the theories of General Douhet, Italian military authorities were among the first to devote attention to the formation of an independent army of the air. While there is now little support for the view that aircraft alone can end a war, the effectiveness of autonomous aerial attack, especially during the first hours of a conflict, is not disregarded. Roughly 70 per cent of the air force is intended for independent action; 20 per cent is prepared for cooperation with the army, while 10 per cent is allotted to the navy.⁷¹ Working in liaison with the land forces, aviation is to aid the terrestrial attack by its own action; some authorities foresee the use of airplanes for the transport of food and munitions to advancing troops.⁷² The number of Italian planes in commission and in reserve on June 30, 1934 was stated to be 1,861, but it has since grown steadily.⁷³ New bombing planes able to carry a 3,000-pound bomb load to any point on the Mediterranean littoral are being turned out in quantities.⁷⁴

THE SOVIET UNION

The Soviet Union, with an unmatched land area inhabited by a large and rapidly increasing population, faces defense problems differing markedly from those of other European nations. Military leaders in the U.S.S.R. must envisage simultaneous hostilities in East and West, thousands of miles apart. On the analogy of the pre-war Schlieffen plan, under which the Germans crossed Belgium into France, the buffer states on the Soviet western border are not deemed complete protection against German aggression. Soviet authorities fear a Nazi attack on their territory, with Germany using Finnish airports and advancing on land through Lithuania.⁷⁵ Other observers, citing the defection

of Poland from the ranks of France's allies, envisage a Polish-German assault on the U.S.S.R.—the Germans to gain territories in the Baltic region while the Poles attack in the south and retain a portion of the Ukraine.⁷⁶ Meanwhile, Japan's rearmament and recurrent incidents along the Manchurian and Mongolian frontiers, as well as the Japanese policy of constructing strategic railways facilitating an advance into Eastern Siberia, give rise to fears of war in Asia.⁷⁷

With these contingencies to meet, the scheme of military organization for the U.S.S.R. divides the territory of the country into eleven military regions, each with an army composed of several corps. Naturally, the largest forces are concentrated near the frontiers on which the tension is greatest. In the West the strongest military area is the Ukraine, where in 1935 there were five infantry corps containing eighteen divisions, one of them motorized, and two cavalry corps of six divisions in all.⁷⁸ In addition, frontier fortifications extending from Lake Ladoga on the Finnish frontier to the Black Sea were completed in 1934.⁷⁹

In the Far East the military situation is complicated by the fact that the weakness of the Soviet transport system prevents the transportation of large bodies of troops from one frontier to another—a feat accomplished by Germany during the World War. Military leaders have therefore created an "autonomous" army in the Far East, a force which could presumably fight for a considerable period without requiring assistance from the West. The Far Eastern army, based on Khabarovsk, was in 1935 composed of nine infantry divisions grouped in three corps, and two divisions of cavalry with an independent cavalry brigade.⁸⁰ The U.S.S.R. has constructed and garrisoned fortifications along the border, while munitions and aircraft industries, as well as complete forces of tanks,

rangements for the use of foreign air bases by European belligerents are frequent. Some sources maintain that the Soviet Union plans to use bases in Lithuania and Czechoslovakia, while others believe Britain is making advance preparations for establishments in Belgium, Holland and northern France.

76. Henry Bidou, "L'Armée Rouge au Travail," *Vu* (Paris), July 10, 1935, p. 952.

77. *New York Times*, January 15, 1936; J. H. Marshall-Cornwall, *Geographic Disarmament* (New York, Oxford, 1935), p. 177.

78. André Giraudon, "L'Organisation de l'Armée Rouge," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, August 15, 1935, p. 760; cf. Frey Rydeberg, C. Kempff, G. Gärdin, *Russlands Rüstung* (Potsdam, Vöggeneiter, 1935), pp. 36-37.

79. "The Seventh Congress of Soviets of the Soviet Union," Report of Marshal Tukhachevsky, January 30, 1935, *L'Europe Nouvelle*, Special Supplement, February 16, 1935. Also V. Kirschon and A. Afinoguenov, "Les Fortifications de l'Ouest," translated from *Pravda* in *Lu* (Paris), May 3, 1935.

80. Giraudon, "L'Organisation de l'Armée Rouge," cited.

69. *Ibid.*, pp. 494-97.

70. *The Times*, June 20, 1935; Gentizon, "L'Armée Italienne, IV," *Le Temps*, August 22, 1935. It also defends the Fascist régime against internal enemies.

71. Schäfer, *Kriegerisches Italien*, cited, p. 51; Percheron, "L'Armée Italienne," cited.

72. Niessel, "La Doctrine de Guerre Italienne," cited.

73. League of Nations, *Armaments Year-Book*, 1935, cited, p. 526; F. P. R. Dunworth, "The Comparative Strengths of World Air Forces," *Army, Navy and Air Force Gazette*, January 9, 1936, pp. 26-27.

74. *Le Temps*, March 26, 1936.

75. Speech of Marshal Tukhachevsky, Assistant Commissar for Defense, *Le Temps*, January 18, 19, 1936. Rumors of ar-

aircraft, and artillery have been established to complete the self-sufficiency of the Eastern Siberian forces.⁸¹ At the same time, liaison with the West has been strengthened by the double-tracking of the Trans-Siberian railway east of Lake Baikal, construction of a less vulnerable parallel line to the north, and completion of a new motor road from Khabarovsk to Vladivostok.⁸²

In the course of the development of its planned industry, the Soviet Union has continually stressed the element of industrial preparedness for war. Under the first Five-Year plan, the production of war materials was enormously increased, and the process has continued under the second.⁸³ Besides achieving self-sufficiency in virtually all war materials save natural rubber, the U.S.S.R. has shifted the focal point of its modern industrial plant from frontier regions to the Urals-Baikal area.⁸⁴ It consequently possesses a degree of invulnerability equalled only by the United States.

A veritable fetish for secrecy on the part of Soviet military authorities prevents more than a scanty survey of their military doctrine. Since most of the Soviet Union's vital centers are far from its borders, while the cities of potential enemies are within striking range of the Red Army, Soviet war leaders envisage an immediate offensive which may lend a decisive character to the opening phases of a war. Motorized units, working in liaison with the air forces, are prepared to drive rapidly toward the enemy's centers of communication and supply, avoiding direct battle and stabilized war fronts.⁸⁵ Foreign observers claim that ten divisions of infantry are motorized, while the general staff is engaged in the creation of an army of *couverture* which will be entirely transported by motor vehicle.⁸⁶ In 1935 mechanization was stressed, particularly the formation of new mechanized cavalry units.⁸⁷

The expansion of personnel has paralleled the acquisition of material. The number of men under arms was raised from 562,000 in 1933 to 1,300,000 in

January 1936.⁸⁸ With this expansion a comprehensive reorganization of the military system has been effected. Where formerly three-fourths of the enlisted forces had been trained as short-service territorial militia of doubtful military value,⁸⁹ serving in the districts in which they lived, the bulk of the army is now composed of well-instructed conscripts remaining with the colors as long as five years. At present 77 per cent of the armed forces have completed two years of military service and are under arms at vital points; and all the divisions stationed on the frontiers are on a war footing.⁹⁰

Observers are in general agreement that the U.S.S.R. possesses the world's largest military air force, with estimates ranging from 3,000 to 5,000 planes. Soviet aviation, groomed for a sudden offensive, threatens Polish, German and Japanese centers without fear of reprisal. Interesting experiments have been made in the technique of air combat. At maneuvers in 1935 an entire battalion of 700 men, complete with tanks, artillery and light armament was landed behind the enemy lines. Towage of gliders containing explosives is also being developed.⁹¹

Despite this enormous acceleration of war preparation, observers still cite several weak points in Soviet military organization. Among these are a defective railway transportation system; the mediocre performance of air material, especially motors; lack of airplanes held in reserve; poor organization of the aircraft and automotive industries; insufficient training of active officers; and lack of reserve officers.⁹² If these faults are not corrected, the military efficiency of the U.S.S.R. would be limited largely to the opening stages of a war. With the exhaustion of equipment and officers, Soviet war power would markedly decrease until the deficiencies could be restored.

STALEMATE OR DECISION?

From this analysis of the principal Continental armies, it appears that European military organizations are definitely in a state of transition. Slowly,

88. Statement of Marshal Tukhachevsky, *New York Times*, January 16, 1936; League of Nations, *Armaments Year-Book*, 1935, cited, p. 839.

89. Pierre Berland, "L'Armée Soviétique," I, *Le Temps*, December 2, 1935.

90. *Le Temps*, January 18, 1936; *New York Times*, January 16, 1936.

91. Pierre Berland, "L'Armée Soviétique," III, IV, *Le Temps*, December 16, 21, 1935; *The Times*, January 15, 1936.

92. Just, *Militärmacht Sowjetunion*, cited, pp. 55 ff, 59; Captain Cloud, "Russian Air Strength and Weakness," *Army, Navy and Air Force Gazette*, May 9, 1935, p. 374; *New York Times*, February 8, 1936.

81. "The Seventh Congress of Soviets of the Soviet Union," cited; Pierre Berland, "L'Armée Soviétique," IV, *Le Temps*, December 21, 1935; *The Times*, April 14, 1936.

82. Artur W. Just, *Militärmacht Sowjetunion* (Breslau, Korn, 1935), pp. 72-77; *New York Times*, November 5, December 19, 1935; February 5, 1936.

83. Lucien Vogel, "Les Plans Quinquennaux et le Potentiel de Guerre," *Vu*, July 10, 1935, pp. 956-57; Just, *Militärmacht Sowjetunion*, cited, pp. 38-46.

84. Bruce Hopper, "Eastward the Course of Soviet Empire," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), October 1935, p. 37.

85. Pichon, "Guerre d'Hier et de Demain," cited, pp. 11-12.

86. Giraudon, "L'Organisation de l'Armée Rouge," cited, p. 764.

87. Address of Marshal Tukhachevsky before the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union, January 15, 1936, *The Times*, January 17, 1936.

and in some cases with evident reluctance, general staffs are beginning to apply the body of post-war military doctrine. They do not, however, place sufficient trust in any single weapon or method of combat to develop it to the neglect of others. To do so would be to run an enormous risk of failure. Conservative military men are necessarily swayed by the consideration that every new offensive device gives rise to the production of a means of defense of some potential value.

Yet increasing tension in international affairs has hastened the acceptance of new war machines and their production in quantity. At one time, when funds allocated for military purposes were relatively small, a public debate arose in France on the question whether the government should utilize its limited resources to build an "army of effectives" stressing man-power, or an "army of material" manned by specialists. The issue is no longer acute. In France, as elsewhere, it is now possible to pursue both aims simultaneously.⁹³ Without in the least ceasing to provide general military training for the masses—on the contrary, while intensifying it—the nations of Europe have immensely augmented their striking power by large increases in the realm of aviation, mechanization and motorization. There is, however, no clear sign as yet that the new developments can be relied upon for quick, absolute decision. Given evenly matched forces, it is not likely that a war will be ended in a few days or weeks. Armies are rapidly becoming motorized, but mechanization, involving the use of armored fighting vehicles to face machine guns, is not yet extensive enough for major tank and combat car operations. Hence one school of thought fears that chances for a military stalemate may be even greater than in 1914. Although large forces may now be rushed to weak points by motor, the equipment of these troops is not sufficiently modern to enable them to take the offensive when they arrive.⁹⁴

There are other factors, not present in 1914, which militate against quick collapse of the vanquished. As the European powers drift toward controlled economy, they shape the development of their industry and agriculture in such a way as to heighten self-sufficiency to a degree inconceiv-

able before 1918. They also set up systems of industrial mobilization under which industry may be converted to war production in the shortest possible time and with the least serious inconvenience to the nation's economic life.⁹⁵ Perhaps even more important are the measures taken to indoctrinate the populace for war and raise its moral stamina. Aside from continual chauvinist propaganda, especially in countries under dictatorship, the training of boys and youths is calculated spiritually to prepare the rising generation for conflict. The most intense efforts are being made to accustom civilians to the great new danger of air attack. In the light of statements by air experts that really effective defense of the populace is impossible,⁹⁶ such measures as sham raids, the public sale of gas masks, construction of shelters, organization of rescue and decontamination corps, and moves toward relatively immune types of architecture must be regarded chiefly as palliatives adopted more for steeling civilian morale and preventing panic than for actual air defense.

Lack of the power of absolute decision, however, does not necessarily mean a struggle comparable in length to the World War. If Europe faces a military deadlock, it does so on a level of consumption of resources much higher than that of 1914-1918. This fact follows from technological development in the sphere of war as well as the creation of more efficient mechanisms for engaging the total resources of the nation at once. Hence observers who believe that the opening drive by air forces and motorized and mechanized sections will probably fail to bring victory expect a war of only one year or a little more. With material depleted and trained man-power exhausted by the opening shocks, both powers will pause while their industrial machines replenish war supplies. Then further attacks will probably be launched, and the process of prostration through offensive effort will be repeated. Under these circumstances, it is held that while a modern European war could hardly enter a decisive phase before six months after its outbreak, it could hardly continue beyond another six months.⁹⁷

95. Helmut Bauer, "Wirtschaftsrüstung des Auslandes," *Der deutsche Volkswirt*, July 19, 1935, pp. 1954-57.

96. Cf. Statement of Stanley Baldwin, House of Commons, November 10, 1932, cited; for further evidence, cf. Union of Democratic Control, *Poison Gas* (London, 1935), pp. 45-61.

97. Eimannsberger, *Der Kampfwagenkrieg*, cited, p. 214. For corroboration, cf. Jean Jules Henri Mordacq, *Les Leçons de 1914 et la Prochaine Guerre* (Paris, Flammarion, 1934), pp. 214-15.

93. Cf. Sikorski, *La Guerre Moderne*, cited, pp. vi, vii.

94. Cf. B. H. Liddell Hart, *When Britain Goes to War: Adaptability and Mobility* (London, Faber, 1935), pp. 70-72. In default of sufficient mechanized units, this group urges rapid development of the offensive power of aircraft. *Ibid.*; also leading articles in *The Times*, February 10, March 6, 1936.